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Voltage transients induced in electric power 
line* and control circuits ay the olettraaaguatlc 
pate* fPJgf) from Mgm altitude nuclear detonations 
say cams* uUatw etil mower fo l iar* and faraiia in 
electric power systems. This report eontaira a 
parametric etmty of DO? potior line surges an* «i«-
cusaes protective manures to minimize thoir effects. 
Since BO? surges h»*e considerably gromtar rataa of 
riaa than lightning surges, i etaamontsit ttandardt 
and tost pcocadiaraa a n given to assure that surge 
arrostars protect equipment from dosage by 9 9 . 
Defected disturbancos and daamge to power systems 
ara reviewed, and actions ara presented which dis­
tribution companies can take to counter than. 
These include backup communications methods, stock­
piling of vulnerable parts, repair procedures, and 
dispatcher actions to prevent blackout fro* BfP-
caused instabil i t ies. A long-range program is 
presented for improving distributors' protection 
against WP. This involves employee training, hard­
ware protection for power and control circuits, and 
improvement of plans for emergency action. 
I . irrotJOXTTtt: 
1.1 aacigir osr.i 
The gsaaa radiation fro* a single hf#t..»*ltita4e nuclear explosion 
can produce an • ! « ti — f setie pclse •'KF1 whit* blanket* • Urfe frac­
tion of the Halted States. For enaple, a height af bur*t of 1J0 tea » i l l 
111—1 net* a circle of 1200 h* reaias, ana i f UMI aat^Atiaa &s of taffi-
elant height (Vx> lam) and suitably placed (over tha gejeraanic canter) tha 
• V will else*** the entire continental United State* (Tiff- 1-1)-
TM« »u? f r n a high-altitude expleaicr. is rmj brief in duration, 
bet (icverthelees, vary intense- The elactr Magnetic energy free sash 
a pels* viU >e coupled into all extended conducting structures cwfa a* 
antenna* and trensatasion line*. The surge* induced in *aeh structure* 
Kara been studied and rvpartsJ.1**** Voltage* induced can exceed ana 
alllion volt* and current* can raaeh tar. thousand eaperec. The tise of 
duration of each an BOVindueed *iarg* ia typically of tha order of a few 
*i<roseconda or laaa. 
Each surge* will be ubiquitous on a powar cystea, figuratively 
searching out any and al l weaknesses in tha sys tea. At previous stadia* 
have shown, these weaknesses are exploited by EKP to cause arcing utd 
flMhovar with consequent power follow (the continual flow of ac power 
across an arc or flaehover after i ts initiation) and circuit Breaker and 
recloeer action, puncturinf of insulation, and aalfunction or deaage to 
unprotected supervisory control as wall as to unprotected coaaunication* 
equipaent.*'* Cumulative effects due to multiple high-altitude nuclear 
explosions sight well cause lockout of reclocing breakers. Collective 
effects due to the widespread nature of the EKP can affect the stability 
of the entire power grid.* 
1.2 Objective and Scope 
The objective of the present study is to produce guidance material 
for use by powar companies to upgrade their system with respect to EKP 
protection. 
The icope of the work is as follows: 
1. Develop standards and techniques for the use of EKP protection 
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devices in power transmission and distribution systems, this includes 
the use of a combined lightning, and BMP arrester. 
2. Develop measures that could be taken to help protect a local 
power syctea, assuring a few minutes warning period. 
3. Determine ready recognition means that an IMP event has occurred 
and what actions can be taken by local power companies. These may in­
clude considerations of system instabilities, as well as the recovery of 
critical civilian systems such as water and sewage. 
-. Outline a program by which a power company may upgrade its sys­
tem with respect to OfP vulnerabilities. 
This report serves to outline such a program for protecting power 
distribution companies against SKP effects. 
II. EMP U K E StRGES 
2.1 The 31P Environment 
The detonation of a nuclear weapon is accompanied by intense tran­
sient electric and magnetic fields called the electromagnetic pulse 
(BMP). The characteristics of EMP have been described in previous 
reports.1"* A brief description is repeated here in order to give the 
assumptions used in this study. 
The electromagnetic fields radiated from nuclear detonations vary 
greatly with weapon yield and detonation location. An intense EMP is 
proauced by both low- and high-altitude detonations. Compared to high-
altitude detonations, the fields produced by low-altitude detonations 
attenuate quickly with distance from the blast and are normally accom­
panied by shock waves. Power lines which would be affected by low-
altitude EMP would probably be damaged by the shock from the nuclear 
blast. For this reason, low-altitude EMP is not vury significant for 
commercial power systems. 
The fields produced by a detonation at anout fifty kilometer* or 
greater is called high-altitude EMP. A single high-altitude EMP can 
cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and will likely encom­
pass an entire commercial power grid. Electrical surges will be induced 
almost simultaneously in all of the transmission and distribution lines 
in the system. Most of these lines will be completely free from the 
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shock an«i other effects of the nuclear blast. In the event of a nuclear 
attack, commercial power system*; in nearly all parts of the nation are 
expected to be subjected to numerous BMP's produced by the detonation 
of megaton-range weapons just outside the earth's atmosphere. High-
altitude EKP is very significant to commerical power systems, and its 
effects are considered in this study. 
The high-intensity electromagnetic fields radiated from high-
altitude bursts are largely the result of the interaction of the geo­
magnetic field with the Compton current which is due to the gamma radia­
tion. The direction of the electric field is normally at right angles 
to the earth's magnetic field. For the continental United States, the 
geomagnetic dip angle is 60 to 70 degrees. This Implies that the inci­
dent 9<P electric field is likely to lie between zero and 30 degrees 
off the horizontal, depending on the direction of propagation of the 
incident wave. 
For the purpose of calculating surges induced in power lines by 
EMP, an analytical representative pulse is used. An EMP line surge is 
a function of the amplitude and time history of the EMP * veil as many 
other parameters. To reduce the number of parameters in a study of EMP 
surges and for the purpose of establishing a standard, it is convenient 
to choose a fictitious plane wave pulse with an amplitude, rate of rise, 
and a decay time which exceeds those of most EKP's. This fictitious 
pulse will induce power line surges of magnitudes and durations equal 
to or larger than those of the possible range of likely EMP line surges. 
The representative pulse that we have selected is a double exponential 
with the electric field given by 
E(t) = E ^ e " 0 * - e* 6 t) , (2.1) 
where 
E Q = 0A.5 kV/m (2.2) 
a - 5 z *? •ec"1 (2.3) 
9 » : x Uf sec"1 . (2.'0 
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The electric field waveform given by Eq. (2.1) is shown in Fig. 2.1. 
The peak electric field is 90 kv/m. The time to peak is about 10 ns and 
the total fall U s e is near 1j. sec. 
2.2 Coupling Analysis 
Above-ground pover lines are excellent receiving antennas for EMP. 
They can collect large amounts of energy due to their length; distribu­
tion lines have typical lengths of 1-30 miles. The EMP current surges 
induced in each of the three phases of the line are almost identical, 
large voltages are developed between each phase and the earth ground 
which forms the return conductor for the common aode currents. BMP-
induced phase-to-phase voltages are relatively swell. Therefore, for 
the purpose of coupling analysis, it suffices to consider a one-wire 
model of a power line. 
An infinitely long wire of radius a and height h above the earth is 
shown schematically in Fig. 2.2. The incident representative EMP plane 
wave and induced current are also shown. The incident direction of the 
BMP is determined by the angles qp and 9 associated with the propagation 
vector k as shown. The direction of the electric field is then specified 
by the angle $ between the electric field vector E and the vertical plane 
containing the propagation vector k. The magnetic field vector B is per­
pendicular to both B and k, such that (B, B, k)form a right-handed ortho­
gonal set. The angle between E and the horizontal is given by sin"1 
(sin 8 cos f). For example, if 8 * 0, the wave propagates vertically 
downward and both E and B are horizontal. If 8 i 0 and * * 90°, then E 
is horizontal, but % has a vertical component. If additionally <p • 90°, 
then E* it parallel to the wire. For detonations over the continental 
U.S. the angle between E* and the horizontal is always less than 30°, so 
8 and % are restricted to the range sin 8 cot % s. 1/2. The values of 8 
and f given in Table 2.1 were chosen to lie in this range. 
A parametric study on the EMP line surges has been performed to ob­
tain representative surge waveforms. The retultt are presented later in 
this section and in the Appendix. The EMP voltage and current surges 
depend strongly on the incident EMP parameter! and load impedance, and 
lets strongly on the geometric parametert and the line and earth 
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Table 2.1. S unwary of EMP lint iwgca 
Incident anglea I n f i n i t e l ine Traniforner termination Short c i rcu i t 
fdegreea; l r V P ftoft *P V P R« *P 
e 9 * (HA) (*v) (kv/ni) (KA) (kV) (W/nt ) (M) 
60 0 60 2.2 950 13. H P. 75 1700 9.5 fc.l 
60 30 60 2.53 9^5 36. fc 3 . 9 i6no 12!. 0 U.6 
60 30 90 2 .0 760 19.6 3 .0 1000 8.0 3.55 
60 90 90 1.35 0 .0 0 .0 1.57 525 '•.!» 1.67 
80 90 90 0.75 0.0 0 .0 0.70 190 1.72 0.75 
80 30 &> I .65 700 10.0 2.25 1320 5.3 3 .0 
80 30 90 1.23 5U0 3'*. 6 2 .2 590 6.0 2.35 
80 0 60 10.0 U850 23,2 9 .7 9000 32.8 19.5> 
MOTE: I p • PMk current 
V P = Peek voltage 
ROR - Rate of rife fro* 10 to 90 percent of peak. 
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conductivities. To simplify the parametric study, we have chosen typi­
cal values for the geoaetrlc par—stws and conductivities. Typical 
values for distribution lines are: line height, h, equal to 10 asters; 
wire radius, a, equal to 5 ailliaoters for 2/0 wire; the resistivity for 
eo—rrial annealed copper is 1.7?- x 10"* ccntiaeter-ohas; and a co—on 
earth conductivity is 5 aHHahos per meter. The angles «, t y and | are 
varied over practical ranges, three load impedances arc used, the charac­
teristic iapedance of the line (the infinite line case), a short circuit, 
and a aid-frequency aodel of a transformer. 
2.3 Surges on a long line 
The current induced by BO? on a long line of several miles is simi-
lar to that induced on an infinitely long line. The infinitely long 
line is therefore a convenient aodel for the single power line that ex­
tends several miles in both directions froa the point where the surge is 
calculated. 
The current and voltage surges induced on an infinitely long line 
ID a above the earth by the representative IMF for various wave incident 
directions and polarisations are presented in Figs. Al through Ao of the 
Appendix. As a representative exaaple. Fig. 2.3 shows the WP line surges 
for the incident wave parens tare t « 30°, « » 30°, and f « 90°. The cur­
rent in Fig. 2.3 has a peak of near 1.2 kA and the induced voltage has a 
peak of over 500 kV. After one Microsecond, the surges have decayed to 
a relatively low value. 
The current waveform have been calculated froa a first-order solu­
tion of an infinite wire above the gitund. Scattering theory was used to 
calculate the current response of a wire in free space. The approxiaate 
effect of the ground was included by using the total field, incident plus 
ground-reflected, in the "free space'* solution. In this aanner the first 
ground reflection, which is the Major effect of the ground, is included 
in the solution but subsequent wave reflections between the wire and 
ground are not. The voltage wsveforas were calculated froa transmission 
line theory,* i.e., the voltage is equal to the product of the current, 
the cosine of the angle between the line current and the propagation vec­
tor, and the characteristic impedance of the transmission line formed by 
11 
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the earth by representative DIP with 9 - 80°, 9 > 30°, and f » 90°. 
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the l ine and the earth. The voltage calculated by transmission line 
theory i s called the induced voltage. The induced voltage added to the 
voltage froa the incident field i s the total voltage on the l ine. 
2.U. Surges on a Una Terminated by a Transformer 
The BIP surges on a long l ine above the earth terminated by an 
iapedance 2f can be aodeled as a scad-infinite l ine as shown in Fig. 2.k%. 
The induced surges can be computed froa transmission line theory by em­
ploying the current induced on an infinite l ine as a current source. 3 
TO determine the impedance of a transformer, consider the aid-frequency 
model of the distribution transformer as shown in Fig. 2.Ub. I t <s based 
on the capacitance coupling effect of the transformer; C c i s the priaary-
to-secondary vinding capacitance and C, i s the secondary winding-to-ground 
capacitance. The transformer termination impedance i s approximately the 
impedance of the capacitive network for the mid-frequency range between 
several hundred hertz and about 3 MHz. 
The surges induced on a seed-infinite line 10 m above the earth ter­
ainated by the mid-frequency model of a transformer are shown in Pigs. A7 
through A13 of the Appendix for a range of incident wave directions and 
polarizations. A representat've example i s shown in Pig. 2.5 for 6 = B0°, 
9 = 30°, and f = 90°. Current and voltage peaks in Pig. 2.5 are about 
2 KA and 600 kV, respectively. 
2.5 Short-Circuit Current Surges 
The 90? current surges through a short circuit are of interest for 
specifying the current handling capability of surge arresters. The 
short-circuit current can be computed by the same method used in sub­
section 2.U with Z£ = 0.0. The current surges through the short circuit 
of a semi-infinite l ine 10 a above the earth are shown in Figs. Alk 
through Alo of the Appendix for a real ist ic range of incident wave di­
rections and polarizations. Bcamples of the short-circuit current surges 
are shown in Fig. ?.6 f or 9 * 30° and f = 90°. Figure 2.6a shows the 
surge for <p = 30° and Fig. 2.6b shows the surge for qp = 90°. Bote that 
the peak current for -p » 30° i s about three times that for <p * 90°. 
13 
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2.6 Results of the Paraaetric Study 
The results of the parametric study of EMP line surges are summa­
rized in Table 2.1. The values presented in the table have been esti­
mated froa the surge waveform presented in this section and in the 
Appendix. 
The current peaks for an infinitely long line are within the range 
froa 0.75 kA to 10 kA and the line voltage peaks range froa 0.0 to J-B50 
kV. The induced line voltage is zero for cases where the electric field 
vector is parallel to the wire. The voltage rate of rise, froa 10 to 90 
percent, of the voltage surges ranges froa 0.0 to 36.U kV./os. The general 
effect of the trans foraer teraination is an increase in the peak current 
and voltage surges and a decrease in the rate of rise of the voltage 
surge. The transformer voltage rate of rise ranges froa 1.72 to 3?. 8 
kV/ns. The short-circuit current surges have peaks that range froa 0.75 
to 19.5 kA. 
The calculations of the EKP-induced line surges presented in this 
report neglect corona and other discharge acchanisas. (Corona discharge 
can reduce the GKP surge peaks and rates of rise by 20 percent or more.)* 
These surges are therefore considered as an acceptable and conservative 
basis for EMP protection requirements. 
III. SIEGE PROTECTION REQURlXBnS 
3.1 I n traduction 
Present-day electric power systcas use sany devices and components 
for the protection of equipaent. These include circuit-opening devices, 
such as fuses or circuit breakers with protective relay systems, re­
actors, condensers, regulators, and lightning arresters. The lightning 
arrester, or aore appropriately the surge arrester, is the device that 
is depended upon to provide protection against surges such as those pro­
duced by lightning and EMP. A surge arrester differs froa other surge-
protective devices such as spark gap In that it is designed for repeated 
Halting of voltage surges on 50 or 60 hertz power circuits by passing 
surge current and then automatically interrupting the flow of ac power 
follow current. Spark gaps do not always interrupt power follow current. 
1? 
The present standards on surge arresters are based largely or. l ight­
ning protection requirements. I f these devices are to be used for pro­
tection against EEP, then the standards must be revised to include EKF 
protection requirements. 
3.2 Present Standards 
Surge arresters are designed and manufactured according to Ae^-i~*r. 
Rational Standard ANSI c£2.1-l?71. This i s essentially identical to 'he 
Institute of Electrical and Electrorics Engineers Standard IEEE Std ?--
197? and constitutes, by reference only, an integral pert cf the Rational 
Electrical Manufacturer's Association (KB*) Standards Publication for 
Surge Arresters, IA 1. 
These standards include: (1) basic definitions applicable to surge 
arresters, (?) standard service conditions under which an arrester i s 
required to operate successfully, (3) the classification of arresters 
and the voltage ratings of arresters in each class, (-) construction 
standards including identification to be included in labeling, mounting, 
and terminal connections, and (>) various design and conformance tests . 
The tests are of nine types: 
(1) Surge and power-frequency voltage withstand tests of the ar­
rester insulation with internal parts and external series-gap electrodes 
removed. 
(2) Power-frequency sparkover tests of the arrester to establish 
that the completely assembled arrester can withstand the rated power-
frequency operating voltage with a specified margin of safety. 
(3) Tests which determine the impulse sparkover voltage*time charac­
terist ics . These characteristics show the relation between impulse 
sparkover voltage and time to sparkover for specified impulse wave shape 
which are chosen to be representative of typical lightning and switching 
surges. 
(U) Discharge-voltage testa which show the voltage across the ar­
rester terminals while the arrester is discharging as a function of the 
discharge current. The standards fix the shape of the current surge 
and specify several current crest values. 
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(5) Wscbsxge-current-withsrand tests consisting of (a) high-current, 
short-duration and (b) low-current, long-duration tests . These serve to 
deaonstrate the adequacy of the electrical, Mechanical, and tberael design 
of the arrester. 
(6) Duty-cycle tests to establish the ability of the arrester to inter­
rupt follow current successfully and repeatedly under specified conditions. 
(7) Radio-influence-voltage test to provide a measure of the high fre­
quency voltage generated by an arrester. Such voltages amy cause objection­
able co—unicatlon interference. 
(9) lntcrnal-ioni;%tion-voltage test to provide a measure of ioniza­
tion current within the arrester. Such currents say cause deterioration 
of internal arrester parts. 
(9) Pressure-relief tests to deaonstrate that failed arresters will 
withstand ensuing fault current under specified conditions without violent 
disintegration. 
3.3 Recommended Standards for BfP Surge Arresters 
An arrester which i s to be used for protection against OfP-induced 
surges as well as for lightning and switching surges should conform not only 
to the standards set forth in ANSI Co2.1-1971 but also to additional or modi­
fied standards. These additional standards should reflect the fact that 
mp-induced surges have greater rates o£ r ise and shorter tines to crest 
values than do lightning surges. As indicated in the Appendix, the rates 
of rise say be greater than 30 megavolts per microsecond and the virtual 
duration of wave fronts (as defined in the ARSI standard) may be as short 
as 20 nanoseconds. These numbers are not necessarily "worst case" numbers, 
but they can form a basis for specifying requirements against DfP-induced 
surges. 
In order for a surge arrester to protect a systeu from high-voltage 
surges such as those produced by DIP, i t i s necessary that the arrester set 
sufficiently fast so that surges capable of producing damage to equipment 
will be substantially modified by the action of the surge arrester. Th«N» 
will always be an in i t ia l part of the surge vl-tch escapes the modifying 
action of the arrester's discharging. This part of the surge passed on 
must be incapable of damaging the equipment whicn is being protected or of 
causing control circuits to malfunction in such a way that performance or 
operation is interrupted for onacceptably long periods. Otherwise, the 
arrester i s not providing sufficient protection. 
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With the foregoing statements in mind, and pending the establish­
ment of formal standards by organisations such as IEEE, ANSI, and NEMA, 
the following additions to ANSI C62.1-1971 are recommended for arresters 
to be used for BMP- as well as Hghtnlng-surge protection. 
Impulse tests of arrester insulation withstand test voltages should 
include, in addition to those given in Table 3 on page Ik of ANSI C62.1-
1971, impulse tests using a COS x 1 full wave (see definition 2.29.1 of 
ANSI C62.1-1971) with crest values of 5 MV or crest values 50 times those 
given for impulse tests in that table, whichever i s smaller. 
Additional front-of-wave impulse sparkover tests should be made 
using nomine? rates of rise as follows: 
Voltage rating Nominal rate of rise 
in ttilovolts 
less than 3 500 kV/»s 
3 through UB 5 MV/n« for each 12 kV 
of arrester rating 
Above UB 20 MV/m 
The arrester insulation must not flashover during these tests . 
The EMP impulse sparkover voltage-time characteristics may be deter­
mined as follows. Using a 0.02 x 1 wave shape beginning at a crest volt­
age below arrester sparkover, the prospective test voltage shall be 
raised in steps until sparkover occurs. Continue the increase in pro­
spective voltage for at least three steps until the time to sparkover or 
the rate of rise approaches that of the foregoing additional front-of-
wave test . Five tests at each step using that polarity which gives con­
sistently higher sparkover values are sufficient. The arrester insula­
tion must not flashover during these tests . 
Discharge voltage characteristics shall be determined for EMP-type 
surges in addition to those tests given in the standards. For these 
tes ts , a 0.16 x O.fc current waveform shall be used. For each rating of 
a given arrester design between 1 and 12 kV and of prorated sections for 
ratings above 12 kV, obtain discharge-voltage time and current-time 
oscillograms using 1,000, 2,000, and 5,000 ampere crest values. From 
these, obtain the discharge-voltage-current characteristics for each 
rating or prorated section. 
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Or. each arrester for which the design has beer tested according to 
the above additional BMP standards there shall be firmly attached identi­
fication data which includes a statement that the arrester (design) hat 
been tested using EKP-type surge standards. 
In summary, a preliminary set of tests and standards has been given 
for surge arresters, in addition to those specified by the American 
National Standards Institute. These additional standards are intended 
to serve as a guide to setting standards for surge arresters to be used 
for protection against IMP surges as well as against lightning and switch­
ing surges. 
The usefulness of any standards such as these is limited unless co­
ordinated with similar standards for testing insulation withrtand voltages 
for EMP-type surges. In particular, such standards should be established 
for transformers and insulators. 
Some of the numbers in these preliminary standards are certain to be 
modified. Nevertheless, the rates of rise, voltage withstand levels, cur­
rent and voltage crest values, and the wave shape of the proposed standard 
0.02 x 1 voltage pulse are sufficiently veil established that a great deal 
of protection against EKP can be assured by using these standards. 
3.U. Surge Arresters Presently Available 
Modern surge arresters are classified by the IEEE and NEMA standards 
as station, intermediate, distribution, and secondary arresters. Station 
arresters are used to protect large and important transformers and switch-
gear. Intermediate arresters are used to protect smaller or less impor­
tant transformers and switchgear. Distribution arresters are used to 
protect distribution transformers and other distribution apparatus* And 
secondary arresters are used to protect equipment connected to secondary 
circuits of voltages up to 650 VAC* 
Other arrester classifications used by NEMA are protector tubes, 
gaps, and protective resistors. Protector tubes are used to protect in­
sulators and pole-top switches. Gaps are used to isolate circuits from 
each other under normal conditions and to provide a path for surges. 
Protective nonlinear resistors are used to provide a surge shunt for 
apparatus such as series winding of regulators and generators. 
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Arresters w e rated in tents of ac voltage. Distribution arresters 
are also rated in terse of current. The voltage ratings of arresters 
cover different ranges according to type: station arresters range froa 
3 KV to 6-- kV, intermediate arresters range froa 3 kV to 120 kV, distri­
bution arresters range free 1 kV to 30 kV, and secondary arresters range 
froa 175 V to 650 V. The ainiaua crest current standard for an arrester 
is for a surge current having a (^  to 8) x (1C to 20} waveshape. The 
crest currents are: 100 kA for station arresters, 65 kA for intermediate 
and distribution arresters, and 10 kA for secondary arresters. 
The impulse sparkover voltage of a station surge arrester rated 
above 15 kV ranges froa two to three tiaes its voltage rating for a surge 
having a 1.2 kV/ns rate of rise. The aaxiaua discharge voltage also 
ranges froa two to three tiaes the arrester's voltage rating for 10 kA 
surges. A station arrester rated under 15 kV has a sparkover voltage of 
about three tiaes its voltage rating for a voltage surge with a rate of 
rise of 1 kv/ns per 12 kV arrester rating. And the aaxiaum discharge 
voltage is also about three tiaes its voltage rating for 10 kA surges. 
Distribution-type arresters are generally less effective in sup­
pressing surges. Sparkover voltages range froa five to seven tiaes the 
arrester's voltage rating for surges with 1 kV/ns rate of rise per 1? kV 
of arrester rating. And the maximum discharge voltage is about five 
tiaes the arrester's voltage rating for 10 kA surges. Secondary arrest­
ers have sparkover voltages that range from six to ten tiaes their volt­
age ratings for a transient with a 0.1 kV/ns rate of rise. The maximum 
discharge voltage of a secondary arrester It about the saae as its spark­
over voltage. 
The general performance characteristics of arresters for surges with 
greater than a 1.2 kv/ns rate of rise is not well known since that infor­
mation is normally not applicable to lightning and switching surges. 
ORNL and a few other groups 1» a' 7 concerned with EMP surges have performed 
limited tests on a few selected surge arresters. Figure 3.1 shows volt­
age waveforms recorded by ORNL for a 15 kV station-type Kearney arrester. 
This arrester is also used as a distribution arrester at ORNL's X-10 
plant. 
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The upper wavefora in each graph of Pig. 3>1 is the applied voltage 
surge with the imttar out of the circuit. The lower cart* is ths ar­
rester response. The voltage svrge was provided by an BO? serge sisn-
lator. The surge fall tiae to half eariaw was set for 1 ^ sec. The 
rise tine and •eplitude of the pulse was varied to obtain a range of 
voltage rates of rise. In Pig. 3.1A, a 0.29 kV/ns rate of rise was 
applied to the arrester. The arrester fired after about 230 na. The 
sparfcover voltage is about 6o kV and the aaxiaua discharge voltage is 
near U0 kV. Figure 3.1b shows the arrester response to a pulse with a 
0.39 kV/ns rate of rise. The arrester fired after about 100 as at near 
75 kV sparkover voltage. The aradjua discharge voltage for this surge 
is 50 kV. In Fig. 3-lb, cable reflections can be seen after 1.5 usee. 
This corresponds to the round trip transit tine in the 500 ft of 50 obnt 
cable (R5-220/U type) between pulser and load. 
In Figs. 3.1c and 3*Id, anch faster rate of rise surges are used. 
The 2 kV/ns surge activates the arrester after 50 ns with a sparkover 
voltage of 75 kV and a discharge voltage of near 50 kV. In Fig. 3-Id, 
the 2.33 kV/ns surge fires the arrester after ^5 ns. The sparkover 
voltage is near 80 kV and the n a x i m discharge voltage is about 55 kV. 
The results of the GRHL test are suaaarized in Fig. 3.2. Results 
for a 9 kV arrester obtained by SRI 7 are shown in Fig. 3-3- This ar­
rester exhibited a greater increase in breakdown voltage for fast rising 
pulses than did the one tested at 0RHL. Tests on a Dale SM-100, 120 
VAC secondary arrester resulted in a sparkover voltage of 7 kV for 5 
kV/ns surges.* 
These results show that the pulse breakdown voltage of the pre­
sently available power line arresters is considerably higher for BO? 
surges than for lightning surges. For relatively slow rising BO? surges 
at 2 kV/ns, the sparkover voltage is about twice that due to lightning. 
More testing with pulses having large rates of rise is needed to deter-
adne arrester characteristics in the range required for BO? protection. 
For a very fast rising surge at 20 kV/ns, the sparkover voltage could 
be as each as tan tines that due to lightning. The effects ot arrester 
lead inductance, which ware not investigated in the OXHL test, will fur* 
ther reduce the effectiveness of surge arresters against fast rising 
pulses. 
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large BO? surge sparhovcr and discharge voltages could have 
toaaaajajaneoB for power ecMpasnt. Insulation breakdown could 
actor on inWrnal ca.ntpa—t wiring, resulting in dosage by ac power 
fellow. To prevent eaelpaaat l i i | i t ioeortant eeulpuent should be 
piotetUd by an arraatar which can effectively • njpnia fjg*, lightning, 
and switching surge*. Plaaantly available pavar line anaatara aheald 
affaatieonaaa in 
If • IMQCTIfl ACnOaTi MB 
* . l leview of exported fjft? gffacta 
in the electric power linos exceed the basic inealatiaa level on 
distribution lines. Sia&fer series, bet resect 
in eegnitude saponiing epon the enoent of shielding present, will also 
be induced in under grpnni power cables, central lines, 
power •nppllea, and ether condectors associated with electric 
ration, naiiaaJaaiim, distribntion, and central. 
ventetive or corrective action paeaibla jest before or after high-
altitude neclnar detnantlens. 
fc.1.1 rinshoeer and Paver Folio* 
height of beret, the area of coverage of Be? free a 
single high-eltltade detonation can easily bo nest of the United States 
and within tola area substantially onifom BO* field strengths will 
occur. Thus, entire power systcas will bo inpected sinaltaneously. If 
thai a are several detonations over the U.S., each point in the U.S. will 
be affected by the BflVa froa al l high-altitude detonations. 
The Mr-induced surges on distribution lines are ewpocted to cause 
flashovcr at points of laaodance change, comers or ends of linos, and 
locations of reduced insolation level, as wall as across lightning ar* 
ranters. Discharges through lightning arresters will be extinguished, 
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bat « fraction of those ocron insulator* will bo sustained by power 
follow, initiating circuit breaker eperetioe. If three of aor* high-
altitude detonations occur within two or throw aaaatas (with sow* veria-
hisober lockout, aeeessitetiag flannel roeloowro. Consequently, tho die-
tribation systsa looi would ho i—iirt free tho tronowirrlon ootNork. 
i».1.2 Transient Stability* 
Multiple foalUof (flaahevers) ower o large swogtspliUol orom eccoa-
panied by o low of looi too to circuit brookor opsninga could iotoeo 
transient instability ooi wide-eree powor blackouts, to investigate this 
possibility, Mmwilcr recently asdslsd oW-ioiocoi pertarbetiaaa using 
the coapwter transient stability progroa isvslopsd by Philotolphio Has* 
trie Coapsay. A ootwarfc base easo supplied by tho loan asee Valley 
Authority represented aoro than 1500 busses (generators, U t points, and 
loses) ana provided a good tronsiont stability aodel of tho southeastern 
United f tatos. 
In tho staiyv SO? flaahiwsis on tho distribation systaa waro asdeled 
by faulting distribation (not 11 ansa!••Ion) linos earring tstwaan five 
and thirty poreant of tho connected lead in the affeetad area. Paay 
stodies ware ran for different fault densities, sites of p a i f bad area, 
and lapssincM between the faulted distribution lines end the eeaneettag 
lines. Calculation* were done for both a single set of aultiple faults, 
as weald ecear free a single nuclear detonation, and aaltiple faalt sets 
aedeling aaltiple detonations eeeorring within a short period of tiae. 
In general, the aaltiple faalt pertarbations affected the entire 
network in the following Banner. First, within the paitiaied area aoot 
generators accelerated together. However, for a large faalt density, 
aany aachines lost synchronise within the pert orbed area. these aachlnaf 
weald that be reasrat free the rietwerk. A second effect of the MP dis­
turbance was sa interference between the paiterhed and unperturbed areas 
through the transaission tie lines, which seeaed to exacerbate the insta­
bility, particularly within the perturbed area. In order to deteraine 
whether this interference between perturbed and unperturbed areas was 
Indeed disruptive, the aajor t ie lines bstween the faulted and unfeulteu 
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areas were opened before the siaolated •*? was applied, la this COM, 
transient instability was loss likely to oecor; generators la the 
faulted orom l U U accelerated, hot i — lull la syiiehroaization vita 
lated St? about 0.5 aoeoai after the flret perturbation, greatly lu­
cres Md the likelihood of Uonslsiit instability at even a low fault 
density. Pfcjer instability was likely when only a few percent of lead 
I B •TnaaaUaaat CAaBBCAaBBnABBaf f M a a t ( • • • l U i f , , fVfgg* M M * f*gflBjSBfat*efjf» • • * £ tanas? 
•to*/ ia bat a first atteapt to octatadao the effects of aft? aniaiaa 
Uoat oa the traaaalssiom aystea's stability, which la a vary difficult 
problem. Although the aeael of toe power system i s faitc accurate ia 
saao respects, there were aotaral liaitatioM to the study. If the earn-
cloied, although Use targes were studied to so* i f circuit breabsM on 
the traasoissioa systoa weald opes. (Section V.1.3 of this report s i s -
cost as possible effects on tiawwjiaaion system caaponiiila which could 
ioeroase the probability of instability.) Fwrtherworc, only the tran­
sient tfaje period (op to 1-5 seconds following flashover) was coaaidcred. 
oyaaoic instability, which i s a very iapertaat coapoaeat of the total 
•P? effect, and which ocean after the transient period, cannot bo aodtlad 
by the existing- program. Sines the ooltted effects will toad to en­
tourage instability, ws aast conclude that loss of synchronisation and 
rasaltant power blackoet are very likely. On the tie* acale of a ainate 
to a few boors, i t i s possible that hasaa intervention could redace the 
severity of a blackout. 
fc.1.3 Coaaunicatlon and Control Circuit Desage and Malfunction 
ffXP will induce largo •orgs eorrents and voltages ia the tiawjunlia • 
tion and control circuits of power systoas. these serges can cease 
faulty operation of logic circuits sod esa bora oat components, espe­
cially seelconductor diodes, transistors, sad integrated circuits. Mal­
function of control circuits can result in erroneous breaker operation. 
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false tilaaslij of date, and general •naesliag of tlw control reaction. 
Soajtoadattot boroost can bo difficult to repair, psrtiemlerly i f spare 
ports end toot cfeipBent ere not readily available. Power amy bo eveil-
ofclo even i f control -*ircelts or* deaeged, bet wjthoet sees 
fonetions os protective relaying, the 
to daaage by transients, feelts, etc. 
* 1 . ' Pism? Cnnmenfc 
wMle loss likely than control eircoit lawgi, iiaiji to 
windings* bashings, or otbor insulation 
ot lsost too reasons for this. The first i s 
tost too rise tiae for US* surges i s neb shorter toon tost for lightning. 
Insulation levels any not bo adesnately coordinated for tools lost rising 
pulses; conscejeontly, tbsro i s no sssorsneo tost protective devices wiU 
fire before flashover occors in eosfoaents. Even though too energy in so 
BIP surge i s considerably less tbsn in direct lightning strikes, poser 
follow frost toe power line volte** can deaage •sjuipnant by sestalaiag an 
arc initiated by 99. The second reason i s tost, in low lightning areas, 
each sower tqnlp—rt i s not protected by lightning arresters.1* Is 
tected esoipsent, power follow after Be? flasborer asy cease serious 
to transforsers. Fortunately toe trend in 
creased protection, even in low lightning 
*.1.5 Daaage to 
Serges induced in electric power lines will 
fiSBii'i and enter custeners* eaaipasnt, possibly caasiag 
fanctton. Rossltant faults or loss of load can esaearbete toe instability 
©»> %e*Ps? P O W g l F SVaVwCesW 
with standby power can av*d entry of these serges by dls-
connecting thsaselves from lueaniiial power and going to standby power 
i f attack warning is available before the first hl^h-altitsde detona­
tion. Past acting priaary and secondary lightning arresters any also 
help to avoid daaage. Irsnsfarsers attenuate serges soaewhst and 
lengthen their rise tine, increasing toe chance that secondary arras tars 
will be able to dissipate then successfully. Long runs of sbove-groond 
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wire foUowiac the transformer will have emrams iaeaecd ea them which 
m*amameid>ea, framas amd^dhamawaVfmswaamamarat ema** wVaaam wVmwm\ams>fmmVtmmma> atamas a* 4" aana.a>smm' aaa*- aBB*awaaarfraBBiaB> 
h.2 Protective Action Before or Bving Attack 
b.*.l need far Protective Action 
I t is esparto* that hirnV altitedo eetoaatlono w i l l oeear a* the 
aaglnnlng of aa attack, possibly Issuash aaa of aar am tpartaa aa t i -
bal l ist ic aissilaa. larsm tarts at Ik* eeeatry aieht csmsrtaaee so 
ether direct affects of nmtlaar ectoeetioas, being reaote (ram prohahU 
ta amiataia or restore electric paver. These iadaJs the desirability 
of l ight ami •entiletlan for fallow* skelters, the meed far t raf f ic 
signals aai gasoline peaps far cvaceatioa, time rsaeirat for at ta l ly 
shotdown of factories sai cbcmUal process plants, l ight ami poear for 
hospitals, police sai f i r e departments, paaps far water, gas, and saner 
o t i l i t i as , ami general comfort and eld to the population. I f 9s? vers 
• local phwiu—inn ooraTfng with blast or heat, the additiowl effects 
aacribablc to i t woali he minimal. As ft nationwide effect, i t is north-
while to coentsr the ill si apt i re iapact of MP. 
i .2 .2 frspaiatioa in Advance of amclsar Attack 
Bacaaaa l i t t l e t iae would he asmilahle after attack warming, i t is 
essential that seme stems ho taken in advance. Since damage to solid 
stats i rmmuilections sai control esaipaant amy oecar, spare parts, test 
naalpaant, and trained repairman should he available, plans smsald he 
aade for passible caonibslizstion of rsesadaat ••clpaont i s the erent 
that insnfficicot spare parts are available. 
MsrsptioB of eeamonfeations tlaoiajh eealpaant daaage is also pos­
sible. For distribution systems the oast iaportent iiuaaaiiUatlBiia links 
are: f i r s t withlA the system i tse l f , second with the transmission system 
( i f this is a ssmaratt ent i ty ) , ami finally with ssssattsl easterners. 
At present, i t is smite feasible to provide sufficient Bo? protection to 
assure survival of a ainiaal radio tuammniiallona systsa in the UhT ami 
vnY bands.* Howerer, i t i s nacassary in advance of wanting to establish 
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radio nets and common frequencies and to position transceivers, it* this 
is necessary. 
Finally, maintenance and dispatch personnel must be trained to 
know what to expect and what corrective actions are available. For 
example, if a dispatcher observes breaker operation and false telemetry, 
advance training may give him the ability to respond more quickly to 
avoid loss of po\._r through instability. 
h.2.3 Actions upon Receipt of Attack Warning 
Assuming that power companies have planned their response in advance, 
attack warning should trigger the execution of these plans. Maintenance 
vehicles should be prepared for dispatch in event of damage, breaker lock­
out, or loss of telemetry. Test equipment and spare parts should be made 
available, and maintenance personnel alerted. Pre-planned radio nets for 
backup communications with other power companies, other utilities, and 
essential customers should be activated. Customers with standby power, 
whose equipment could be damaged by EWP conducted through power lines, 
should be alerted to disconnect from commercial power and go to standby 
power. The customer may still be in danger from SIP surges induced on 
his own lines, unless he has adequate surge protection. Chemical plants, 
oil refineries, aluminum plants, and other customers requiring time for 
orderly snutodwn should be warned that power failure may be imminent. 
Dispatchers should review generation on line and ready whatever spinning 
reserve is available for possible energizing should some generators lose 
synchronization. 
The study reviewed in Section (U.1.2) indicated that transient in­
stability was somewhat less likely if tie lines between the affected 
area and surrounding areas were opened prior to the occurrence of EMP. 
However, we do not recommend sectionalizing power grids on receipt of 
attack warning, because it will be impossible to determine in advance 
the boundary between afiected and unaffected areas. Further the pre­
liminary nature of this study would make it foolhardy to ignore recent 
power system experience indicating that strong interconnections help to 
prevent blackout. The matter of grid sectionalizing requires consider­
ably more study before it can be recommended as a protective measure 
against EMP-caused blackout. 
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h.2.'± Actions during Attack 
Me exclude, as beyond the scope of this report, other more localized 
weapons effects. Obviously, blast and fire will be icuch more important 
in target areas than will B<P. Furthermore, in these areas repair or 
restoration attempts will be severely hampered by the inadvisability of 
leaving shelter. However, most of the country's area will not suffer 
direct effects under any conceivable attack, and in these locations power 
maintenance, restoration, and repair activities are feasible. We dc not 
know enough about the occurrence of BtP effects to give detailed instruc­
tions for how to carry out these activities, {receding sections have in­
dicated the kinds of disturbances likely to occur; we must leave to the 
ingenuity of power company personnel the preferred response. 
An obvious possibility will be loss of voltage at some location in 
the power system, reported by telemetry, telephone, or the backup radio 
communication net. The dispatcher must then decide whether this is due 
to loss of feed from the transmission system cr a malfunction within the 
distribution system. If the former, he should report this to the trans­
mission system dispatcher (who should already know), and ascertain how 
long power is likely to be out. If the latter, he should localize the 
disturbance and either try to restore power by remote reclosing of 
breakers or else dispatch maintenance crews to diagnose and repair any 
damage. 
This scenario fails if a large amount of damage occurs, for the 
maintenance crews will be overwhelmed. However, EMP tests of communica­
tions and control systems analogous in some respects with power systems 
have indicated that massive damage to equipment is not likely. The most 
common form of damage occurs to semiconductor devices tightly coupled to 
long cables. If we consider the example of a protective relay, this 
would imply concern for the power supply (connected to 115 V power) and 
input and output circuits (connected to sensing wires and control lines). 
Tests have als? shown that failure does not occur in all seemingly iden­
tical equipment. EKP-caused damage tends to be probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. Power engineers are itimiliar with this phenomenon in 
lightning damage, where perhaps only one unit out of several similarly 
33 
struck by lightning will require repair. If 9aint4nar.ee crews arc in­
structed to look first for damage ir. the most likely circuit*, then the 
repair and restoration process can be considerably accelerated. 
Another scenario requiring exceedingly fast action by dispatchers 
is incipient blackout due to IMF-caused flashover. Many of the plans 
developed by the Electric Reliability Councils will be useful in com­
bating this. Rapid load shedding, bringing up of spinning reserve, and 
as a last resort sectional!zing should be considered. 
Dispatchers must be prepared to drop either generation or load very 
quickly. Events on a few seconds time scale are beyond human interven­
tion, but even one-half minute allows for dispatcher response if he is 
aware of what is going on. 
4.2.5 Action Following Attack 
During this period the primary concern will be for power restoration 
and repair of damage. Unfortunately, semiconductor devices, the compo­
nents most likely to be damaged, cannot be repaired. They must be re­
placed from spares. If insufficient spares are available, some control 
functions must be dropped, or else electromechanical backup equipment 
substituted. Fortunately, electromechanical components are much less 
vulnerable to BMP damage than are solid state, so these should be avail­
able for replacement. 
V. BMP PROTECTIVE PROGRAM FOR POWER DISTRIBUTORS 
5*1 Introduction 
It is not possible to develop a single unique, completely detailed 
plan for upgrading a power distribution system with respect to its hard­
ness to EMP. There are a number of reasons for this. 
Not all is known about BMP effects. Much of what we know about 
possible EMP effects is based on combined theoretical calculations and 
limited experimental information. High-altitude testing of nuclear 
weapons is, of course, banned. However, laboratory experiments and simu­
lator testing tend to confirm the theoretical models used.19 
Protective devices presently used for protection against lightning 
on transmission, subtransmission, and primary distribution lines have 
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not been designed or systematically tested for surges such as those 
induced by SMP. However, a number of manufacturers are offering devices 
for protecting secondary distribution lines against BtP-type surges. 
Standards such as these introduced in Chapter III for surge arresters 
have not yet been set for protective gear and equipment. 
Furthermore, each elactric power distributor has its own inherent 
problems and situations. The amount of protection already available, 
the extent to which the distributor depends on supervisory control and 
automatic substations, the amount of lightning protection assumed by 
overhead ground wires, the i3okeraunic level, the company's policy re­
garding the use of technical staff, etc. all point to the fact that the 
individual distributor can best develop a detailed plan to fit its own 
unique needs in an economic and cost-effective manner. 
5.2 Training of Personnel 
The need far protecting transmission and distribution lines and 
associated equipment from lightning has been recognized from the incep­
tion of the electric power industry. The necessity for protection 
against switching surges has been recognized more recently as transmis­
sion voltages have increased. The importance of and need for protecting 
the electric power system against QCP surges have yst to be recognized by 
much of the industry. 
Because of this lack of recognition of the 90* protection problem, 
the first step a distribution system should take in order to upgrade 
itself with respect to Hff vulnerability is to provide its personnel 
with information and training regarding EMP problems. Only with an in­
formed management and technical staff will a power distribution company 
be able to provide BC? protection in a coordinated and economic manner. 
It is not unusual for electric power companies to provide training 
for their employees. Many power companies provide both on-the-job train­
ing courses as well as after-hours courses of the self-improvement type. 
Such courses include subjects such as management principles, safety, 
driver's training, basic electricity, etc. 
Some states provide funds for the purpose of upgrading the techni­
cal capabilities of employees. To provide state or federal funds for 
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sponsoring IMP courses for power distribution company personnel nay 
well be in the national interest, and should be seriously considered. 
The personnel of a power distribution company who nee*! knovleig? 
of QfP include bcih managerial personnel and engineering personnel. The 
managerial personnel need EKP knowledge is background information to 
sake sound decisions for planning for future systems and operations. 
The engineering personnel need information concerning EKP in order to 
assess specific engineering and design details in the coordination of 
EKP protection with lightning and other protection. 
Accordingly, personnel training for EXP protection should be divided 
into two groups: (1) management training and (2) technical and engineer­
ing training. Training courses should be provided to each group. 
The purpose of the training course for management personnel is to 
provide them with basic facts regarding EKP and its consequent implica­
tions and problems. This information is required to make responsible 
management decisions concerning EKP-related problems. 
The outline of such a managerial course on EKP is given below. It 
contests of a seven-hour presentation. Note that two hours of the course 
are devoted to civil defense. This discussion of civil defense includes 
reviews of Russian, Chinese, Swedish, and Swiss civil defense systems as 
well as a review of civil defense goals and requirements in the United 
States. Without such background material in civil defense, the concepts 
of EKP vulnerability and protection are meaningless. 
EKP Course Outline 
(for Management Personnel) 
Civil Defense Primer Hours 
A. Review of Russian, Chinese, Swiss, and Swedish 
Civil Defense Programs 3/~ 
B. U.S. Civil Defense requirements 3 / -
C. The rel iabil ity of electric power during a cr is i s 1/? 
II . EKP Origins 
A. High-altitude EKP production 1/2 
B. Pulse characteristics and range 1/2 
III . Effects of BMP 
A. EKP-induced current and voltage surges in 
cables and equipment 1/2 
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Hours 
B- Effects on materials, components, and equipment 1 
C. Systems effects 1/? 
(1) Distribution system effects 
(2) Stability of the power grid 
IV. a<P Protective Measures 
A. Shielding and Hiring Practices 1 
B. Protective devices 1 
Total 7 
The course for engineering personnel is designed for these who have 
a B.S. in engineering or the equivalent. Again, a review of civil defense 
is included. Technical details omitted in the course for management have 
been included. The number of lecture hours is 21. This is academically 
equivalent to a two quarter-hour course. The outline is as follows. 
BMP Course Outline 
(for Engineering Personnel) 
Hours 
Civil Defense Priaer 
A. Review of Russian, Chinese, Swiss, and 
Swedish Civil Defense Programs 3A 
B. U.S. Civil Defense Requirements 3 / u 
C. The Reliability of Electric Power during a Crisis 1/2 
II . Origins of PIP 
A. Mechanism of QVP Production 1/2 
B. Pulse Characteristics and Range of High-Altitude BMP 1/2 
III . Effects of MP 
A. Interaction and Coupling Mechanisms 2 
B. Common Xbde and Differential Mode on Aerial 
and Underground Cables ? 
C. IMP-Induced Surge Characteristics, Peak Values, 
Time Response, Examples 2 
D. Characteristics of Equipment and Components 
Subjected to Fast EMP-Type Surges; Insulation, 
Transformers, Meters, Relays, Transistors, 
Solid State Devices, Supervisory Control 
Equipment, Cables, Computers, etc. 3 
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Sours 
E. Systeas Effects 1 
1. Lock-Out of Circuit Breakers 
2. Transient Stability Effects 
IV. Protection Against BQ> Effects 
A. IMP Shielding Principles - Conduits, Ubdergrounding 1 
B. Wiring Practices - Grounding 1 
C. Protective Devices - Spark Gaps, Arresters, Filters 3 
D. Coordination of Protection 3 
Total 21 
In addition to the two course presentations outlined above, two cor­
responding sanuals should be available covering the saae aateriaJL These 
can be used as suppleaer.tary texts for the above courses, or they can be 
used as the basis for self study for employees of those distribution com­
panies that are unable to give the above course presentations. 
5.3 Upgrading System Coaaoeients 
Power distribution companies aay upgrade their physical facilities 
with respect to BMP hardness in two respects: (1) increase the hardness 
of the power lines and power apparatus especially with respect: to arcing 
or flashover with attendant power follow and consequent opening; of 
breakers and possible lockout; (2) increase the BMP hardness of auto-
aatic control and supervisory control systeas, especially by the use of 
low voltage arresters, gaps, and filters. 
The problea of lightning surges on power lines has been largely 
solved through the coabined use of arresters, overhead ground wires, and 
relay-operated circuit breakers. Overhead ground wires give little or 
no protection against BMP. Reclosing circuit breakers give protection 
against power follow caused by EMP-induced flashover and arcing, but tht 
occurrence of several surges in a few Binutes can cause the reclosurer to 
lock out- Hence, there is but one possibility for BMP protection of the 
power lines: the arresters Bust be in sufficient nuaber and of proper 
location so that little or no flashover will appear in the systea. 
At pointed out in Ref. (12), the best locations for an arrester are 
at sharp corners, terainals, dead ends, and points of discontinuity. 
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Protection of control circuitry is discussed in ftef. ( ~). Many of 
the measures which have been applied to suppress interference by switch­
ing; surges in Extra High Voltage substations are also useful against BfP. 
Protection of a segaent of the distribution system against H0> 
should receive a priority in accordance with the importance of that seg­
ment. Terns high-voltags subtransmission lines should be the first to be 
protected, since all power oust first flow through these lines. Simi­
larly, those primary distribution lines which serve critical industries, 
utilities, and hospitals should be protected before other primary circuits. 
Of course, facilities which have adequate emergency standby power genera­
tion capability need act be included in such considerations. 
Accordingly, the following priority-ordered protection plan is 
Protection Plan 
1. Harden high-volt&gg sub transmission system. Place surge arres­
ter at all points of discontinuity, end points, terminals, corners, 
(especially those formed with acute angles), and entrances to substations. 
2. Harden the automatic control circuitry associated with high-
voltage subtransmission system. Transistors and other solid state de­
vices must be protected by proper selection of fast-acting spark gaps, 
or metal oxide varistors. 
3. Harden that portion of the primary distribution system which 
serves vital Industries. Place surge arresters at all points of dis­
continuity, end points, terminals, corners, and entrances to substations. 
k. Harden the automatic control circuitry associated with the 
above vital portion of the primary distribution lines. Protect tran­
sistors and solid state devices by proper selection of spark gaps and/ 
or metal oxide varistors. 
5. Harden selected portions of the remaining primary, secondary, 
and control circuitry. In the choice of what protection should be pro­
vided in the final step, the distribution company should consider the 
following points and how they apply to the company's particular 
situation: 
(a) Protect that type of equipment which is occasionally 
observed to undergo failure or malfunction from 
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"normal" transients, such as those from lightning 
and switching operations. 
(b) Combine CMP protection with other requirements. 
(c) Make use of the electromagnetic shielding provided 
by well grounded metallic enclosure with a minimum 
of openings. 
(d) Specify EMP hardness requirements when ordering 
new equipment. 
In formulating the above priority-ordered protection plan, it is 
recognized that each distribution company must make some modifications 
of the plan in order to adapt it to the company's own peculiar require­
ments in a cost-effective manner. 
The following is an example of cost-effective methods of combining 
protection against EMP with other .perational requirements. The Knoxville 
Utility Board has eliminated windows in metal control buildings at un­
manned substations. This decision was made in order to give better insu­
lation so that temperature variations inside the building can be con­
trolled through the use cf a heat pump. Window breakage, through vandal­
ism or natural causes, was of particular concern. Eliminating the win­
dows solved that problem, and at the same time gave an all metal building 
with improved EMP attenuation properties. 
In any national emergency in which the power industry is involved, 
it is important that good communications between the various segments 
of the industry be maintained. Startup and shutdown of plants, opera­
tional adjustments, and maintenance require a combination of telemetering 
and voice-comaunications circuits. Such circuits may be accomplished 
using microwave, UHF, or VHP radio links, leased telephone lines, or 
power-line carrier low-frequency carrier systems. 
Any of these communications circuits may be damaged by EMP unless 
they are adequately hardened. In particular, it is a simple matter to 
protect IMF and VHP radio systems against the effects of EMP, and spe­
cific hardening procedures are given in Ref. (3)« 
It is therefore recommended that all communications facilities be­
tween the various segments of the electric power industry b» backed up 
by an EMP-hardened VHP or UHF radio system. 
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S.h. Plans for Batrgemj Action 
Many electrical distributors hare fat aid cooperative pools in order 
to coordinate their activities. One of the purposes of such a pool is 
to set up asans and channels for providing aid to aialiiis in case of a 
natural disaster or other emergency. The pool organization helps the 
••aim distrib<«tors in the development of taergir-y plans and procedures 
that will result in the availability of personnel and equipment in suf-
ficicnt saoants when a disaster occurs. Inforaation relating to other 
neighboring distributors is sade available and coaaunications procedures 
are established. 
A typical fora for inforaation provided by each distributor and 
aade available to the neighboring aeaber distributor is shown in Plat. 
5.1 and 5>2> Inforaation of particular concern is that relating to 
•cans of cuamanlcation, naaely radio frequencies used, call letters, and 
the name, call sign, etc. of a local anateur radio operator. The aaa-
teur operator should be inforaed of SIP effects and should have B*P pro­
tection on his equipaent. A siailar fora should be aade out and filed 
for local electrical contractors. 
Bach distributor should prepare and have ready: (1) an emergency 
procedure plan and (2) an organizational setup for handling a major 
disaster on its systea. Such an emergency plan should Include plans 
for BtP's wide-spread surge effects as well as for natural disasters, 
including wind, sleet, ice storms, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes. 
This plan should consist of complete, tailor-made details for handling 
the work and arrangements. Emergency procedures for BMP should include 
consideration of the following points: 
1. Radioactive fallout levels should be followed closely. The 
local civil defense unit is the source for inforaation regarding exist­
ing levels as well as expected future levels. Distribution companies 
should acquire some instrumentation of their own for measuring fallout 
levels. Maximum doses should be fixed in the plan, and these should be 
used in determining emergency work schedules. 
One person should be assigned the responsibility of following the 
schedules of the various crews and the corresponding accumulated doses. 
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The rvcommecdations of the national Pnmmlttee on IseiaUoA Iretactice 
and of the International Committee on Rmdiolagical Protection comer J-
lag ami jam permireiale radiation ampuawaa should be observed. la 
particular, their recommendations concerning accidental or emergency 
doses should be noted. Figure 5-3 i* • eap of the United State* sfcow-
iof four-day dose levels dae to fallout from a hypothetical aaelear 
attack. The map is riven here only to indicate the order of magnitude 
of radiation levels from fallout. Weapons sizes have increased sine* 
the date for this amp were accamulstod. Actual fallout dose levels are 
affected by amny factors including mother and seasonal effects. 
?. An initial survey of the extent of damage, amlfunetioas, and 
mix-operations should be made as soon as possible. Time is likely to 
be very precious, thereby giving; this preliminary survey great urgency. 
3. If additional outside help is needed, this should be deter­
mined as soon as possible and communicated to the local civil defense 
headquarters and the district manager for the power pool. Help from 
neighboring electric utilities is not likely since they will probably 
be plagued with similar BMP problems of their own, but this source 
should not be overlooked. Local electrical contractors are valuable 
sources for help. Each distributor should compile and maintain a list 
of contractors available in bis area. 
k. One person should be in charge of delegating work (e.g., the 
construction superintendent) to all outside help brought in. Of course, 
all work may be seriously limited by fallout. 
5. The person in charge should verify that all personnel brought 
in to help are informed of and understand minimal safety practices. 
The following basic safety rules are typical: (a) all substation switch­
ing shall be done by the electric distributor's employees only and 
through orders of the dispatcher only, (b) If a line controlled by an 
Oil Circuit Reclosure (O.C.R.) is to be worked or de-energized, the 
handle must be in an off-position and both leads must be removed from 
line. Local personnel only shall operate an O.C.R., and line number 
and O.C.R. number shall be given to the dispatcher before O.C.R. is 
opened or closed. Ho O.C.R. shall be operated without the use of hot 
sticks, (c) All lines are to be grounded while making repairs. 
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(d) Rubber gloves must be vorn when operating any type of svitch vhich 
is normally hand operated and vhich is energized at over 750 volts. 
5.5 Summary 
I', summary, the recommendations for upgrading a power distribution 
system far EHP protection include the following: 
1. Designate one person to be responsible for EHP technical matters. 
2. Train personnel in BMP — both in the management area and in 
the technical engineering area. 
3. Prepare an emergency procedure plan and organizational setup for 
natural disasters and emergencies vhich include BMP civil defense 
measures. 
U. Review communication links to local civil defense headquarters 
and to the dispatcher and the district manager of the bulk power source. 
Be sure there is an EMP-hard line of communication to each of these. 
5. Establish a policy of continued EMP awareness and a program of 
continually increasing the hardness of the power equipment, and of the 
supervisory control circuitry. 
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APFEKDIX 
HUtAMEBtlC STUDY CP EMP U N E SJRGE3 
h9 
PARAMETRIC STUDY OP EMP LINE SURGES 
The following figures show the current and voltage surges induced 
by representative EMP on a long copper power l ine located 10 a above & 
f i n i t e l y conducting earth. The incident wave parameters 6 , ;p, and f are 
varied over r e a l i s t i c ranges. Three l ine terminations are used: no 
termination ( i . e . , In f in i te ly long l ine case) , mid-frequency model of a 
transformer, and a short c i r c u i t . 
A l i s t o f the figures that follow i s given below. 
Figure Ho. Caption 
A - l Surges induced on an in f in i t e l ine for 9 = 60°, s = 0° , anc 
* = 60°. 
A-2 Surges induced on an in f in i t e l ine for 9 = 60°, ?p = 30°, 
and * = 60°. 
A-3 Surges induced on an in f in i t e l ine for 8 = 60°, c = 30°, 
and f = 90°. 
A-^a Current surge induced on i n f i n i t e l i n e for 8 = 90°, z - 6c° , 
and f = 90°. 
A-fcb Current surge induced on i n f i n i t e l ine for 9 = 90°, c = 60°, 
and f = 90°. 
A-5 Surges induced on an in f in i t e l ine for 9 = 60°, $ = 30°, and 
* = 60°. 
A-6 Surges induced on an infinite line for 9 = 30°, « = 0°, and 
* = 60°. 
A-7 Surges induced on a semi-infinite l ine terminated by a trans­
former for 9 = 50°, <p = 0° , and * = 60°. 
A-8 Surges induced en a s ea l - in f in i t e l ine terminated by a trans­
former for 6 = 60°, <p = 30°, and % = 60°. 
A-9 Surges induced on a semi-infinite l i n e terminated by a trans­
former f or e = 60°, « = 30°, and t = 90°. 
A-IO Surges Induced on a s ea l - in f in i t e l i n e terminated by a trans­
former for 9 - 60°, e = 90°, and # = 90°. 
A - l l Surges induced on a semi-infinite l ine terminated by a trans­
former fcr 6 = 30°, ? = 0° , and f *= 60°. 
A-12 Surges induced on a s ea l - in f in i t e l ine terminated by a trans­
former tor 6 = 80°, ? = 30°, and f = 60°. 
A-13 Surges induced on a semi-infini;e l ine terminated by a trans­
former for 6 = 30°, <p = 90°, and f = 9C°. 
A-li»a Current surges induced on a short-circuited s e a l - i n f i n i t e 
l ine for 0 - 60°, ? = 0° , v»d f = 6o°. 
50 
Figure No. Caption 
A-JAb Current surges induced on a short-circuited semi-infinite 
line f or 6 = 60°, tc = 30°, and f = 60°. 
A-15a Current S'trge induced on a short-circuited seai-infinite 
line for e = 60°, <p = 30°, and * = 90 0 . 
A- 15b Current surge induced on a short-circuited seai-infinite 
line for 9 = oO°, <p = 90°, and f = 90 0-
A-l£a Current surge induced on a short-circuited seai-infinite 
line for 9 = ?0°, tp = 0°, and | = 6o°. 
A-l6b Current surge induced on a short-circuited semi-infinite 
line for 9 = 30°, 9 =• 30°, and * = 60°. 
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Fig. A-1. Surges induced on *n infinite line for 9 * 60°, 
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Pig. A-2. Sorges induced on an inf ini te l ine for 8 - 60°, 
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Fig. A-ll. Sirrgea induced on a aeai-infinitely long line 
10 a above the earth, terainated by a tranaforaer by representa­
tive BfP with 6 = 80°, <p = 0°, and • = 60°. 
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Pig. A-12. Surges induced on a seal-infinitely long line 
10 nt above the earth, terminated by a transformer by representa­
tive Off with 8 = 80 6 , <p = 30°, and f = 60°. 
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Fig. A-13- Surges induced on a seal-infinitely long line 
10 • above the earth, terminated by a transformer by representa­
tive EKP with e = 80°, <p * 90°, and t = 90°. 
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Fig. A-1U. Current surges induced on a seal-infinitely long 
line 10 • above the earth, terainated by a short circuit by 
representative Off with & > 60° and * * 60°. 
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Pig. A-15. Current surges induced on s seed-infinitely long 
line 10 • above the earth, terminated by a short circuit by 
representative WP with % > 60° and f * 90°. 
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Fig. A-16. Current surge! induced on a semi-infinitely long 
line 10 to above the earth, terminated by a short circuit by 
represenUtive BKP with 6 = 80° and * * 60°. 
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